

דף יומי • חזקוני • דף קי"ד

Daf Yomi • The Full Daf • Elucidated Talmud • Navy & Gold Edition • with Rashi

THE SUGYA

We begin the daf by continuing our deep dive into the shakla v'tarya of cooking and eating chelev in milk. The Gemara is bothered by how the rules of "ein issur chal al issur"—that a new prohibition cannot take effect on an already existing one—apply to the acts of cooking and eating meat in milk, bringing a kasha from a braisa regarding piggul, notar, and tamei meats, and offering a teretz based on different Tannaitic views.

From there, the Gemara moves into a fascinating series of derashos based on the three times the Torah repeats the phrase "in its mother's milk." We learn how the Sages derive the prohibitions of cooking meat in the milk of other animals, such as a cow or a ewe, or even the milk of its older sister. The Gemara attempts to build these halachos through a kal vachomer, but Rav Ashi refutes each logical step, showing why we davka need the extra pesukim to teach us these halachos.

All introductions, summaries, and contextual notes are the editor's commentary and are not part of the original text.

עמוד א' DAF 114A

EXPLANATION

כִּיּוֹן דְּעַל אֲכִילָה לֹא לָקִי, אֲבִישׁוּל נָמִי לֹא לָקִי.

Since **on eating** of chelev cooked in milk **he does not receive lashes**, because the prohibition of meat in milk cannot take effect on the already-forbidden chelev, **on cooking** it also **he does not receive lashes**, because the Torah links the two.

EXPLANATION

וְאִיכָא דְאָמְרִי: אֲבִישׁוּל – כִּיּוֹן דְּעַל אֲכִילָה לֹא לָקִי, כִּי פְּלִיגִי אֲכִילָה.

And there are those who say the opposite: Regarding cooking, everyone agrees that he receives lashes, because the rule of a prohibition not taking effect on another prohibition does not apply to the mere act of cooking; **when they disagree**, it is only regarding eating.

EXPLANATION

מֵאֵן דְּאָמַר אֵינּוּ לוֹקֶה – דִּקָּחָא אֵין אִיסוּר חָל עַל אִיסוּר,

The one who says he does not receive lashes for eating it holds that indeed, a prohibition does not take effect on another **prohibition**, and the chelev was already forbidden before the cooking.

EXPLANATION

וּמֵאֵן דְּאָמַר לוֹקֶה – לִהְיוֹת אִיסוּר רַחֲמָנָא לְאֲכִילָה בְּלִשׁוֹן בִּישׁוּל, כִּיּוֹן דְּאֲבִישׁוּל לָקִי – אֲכִילָה נָמִי לָקִי.

And the one who says he receives lashes holds that for this reason the Merciful One expressed the prohibition of eating meat in milk in the language of cooking, to teach that since for cooking he receives lashes, for eating he also receives lashes.

RESOLUTION

ואיפצית אימא: קר אמר חדא, ומר אמר חדא, ולא פליגי.

And if you want, say instead: One Master said one thing, and the other Master said another one thing, and they do not disagree at all, because they are talking about different cases.

OBJECTION

מיתיבי: המבשל במי חלב – פטור, דם שבשלו בחלב – פטור, העצמות והגידים והקרניים והטלפים שבשלו בחלב – פטור.

The Gemara raises an objection from a braisa: One who cooks meat in whey is exempt from lashes; blood that he cooked in milk is exempt; the bones, and the tendons, and the horns, and the hooves that he cooked in milk is exempt.

OBJECTION

הפגול, והנוטר, והטמא, שבשלו בחלב – חייב!

But piggul meat, and notar meat, and tamei meat of a korban, which he cooked in milk, he is liable! This is a kasha, because we see that a new prohibition of meat in milk can indeed take effect on an existing prohibition.

ANSWER

האי תנא סבר איסור חל על איסור.

The Gemara answers: This Tanna of the braisa holds that a prohibition takes effect on another prohibition, whereas Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi hold like the other Tannaim who say it does not.

STATEMENT

המבשל במי חלב פטור, מסייע ליה לריש לקיש, דתנן: מי חלב הרי הן בחלב, והמוחל הרי הוא כשמן.

The Gemara notes: The ruling that one who cooks in whey is exempt supports Reish Lakish, as we learned in a Mishnah: Whey is like milk, and the olive-secretion is like oil regarding the laws of rendering food susceptible to tumah.

STATEMENT

אמר ריש לקיש: לא שנו אלא להכשיר את הארעים, אבל לענין בישול פטר בחלב – מי חלב אינו כחלב.

And Reish Lakish said: They only taught this to render seeds and food susceptible to tumah, but regarding cooking meat in milk, whey is not like milk.

BRAISA

תנו רבנן: "בחלב אמו" – אין לי אלא בחלב אמו, בחלב פרה ורחל מניין?

The Rabbis taught in a braisa: From the words "in its mother's milk" I only have a prohibition in its mother's milk; in the milk of a cow or a ewe, from where do we derive it?

BRAISA

אמרתי, קל וחומר: ומה אמו, שלא נאסרה עמו בהרבעה – נאסרה עמו בבשולו,

You can say an a fortiori argument: If its mother, which is not forbidden with it in mating because they are of the same species, is forbidden with it in its cooking,

BRAISA

פרה ורחל, שנאסרו עמו בהרבעה – אינו דין שנאסרו עמו בבשולו!

a cow or a ewe, which are forbidden with it in mating because they are kilayim, is it not logical that they should be forbidden with it in its cooking!

BRAISA

תלמוד לומר "בחלב אמו".

Therefore, the verse teaches by repeating "in its mother's milk" a second time to include them.

QUESTION

והא למה לי קרא? הא אתיא ליה!

The Gemara asks: But why do I need a verse? This is already derived from the kal vachomer!

ANSWER

אמר רב אשי: משום דאיכא למימר מעיקרא דדינא פירכא, מהיכא קא מייתיית לה? מאמו,

Rav Ashi said: Because there is to say a refutation at the very start of the law: From where do you bring it? From its mother.

ANSWER

מה לאמו שפן נאסרה עמו בשחיטה, תאמר בפרה שלא נאסרה עמו בשחיטה?

What is unique about its mother is that she is forbidden with it in slaughtering on the same day; can you say the same of a cow, which is not forbidden with it in slaughtering? Therefore, the kal vachomer is refuted.

ANSWER

תלמוד לומר "בחלב אמו".

Therefore, the verse teaches "in its mother's milk" to include other species.

BRAISA

תניא אידך: "בחלב אמו" – אין לי אלא בחלב אמו, בחלב אחותו גדולה מנין?

It was taught in another braisa: From "in its mother's milk" I only have a prohibition in its mother's milk; in the milk of its older sister, from where do we derive it?

BRAISA

אמרתי קל וחומר, ומה אמו שנכנסה עמו לדיר להתעשר – נאסרה עמו בבשול,

You can say an a fortiori argument: If its mother, which enters with it into the pen to be tithed together, is forbidden with it in cooking,

BRAISA

אחותו שלא נכנסה עמו לדיר להתעשר – אינו דין שנאסרה עמו בבשול!

its sister, which does not enter with it into the pen to be tithed because they are of different years, is it not logical that she should be forbidden with it in cooking!

BRAISA

תלמוד לומר "בחלב אמו".

Therefore, the verse teaches "in its mother's milk" a third time to include her.

QUESTION

והא למה לי קרא, הא אתיא ליה?

The Gemara asks: But why do I need a verse? This is already derived from the kal vachomer!

ANSWER

אמר רב אשי: משום דאיכא למימר מעיקרא דדינא פירכא, מהיכא קא מייתיית לה? מאמו,

Rav Ashi said: Because there is to say a refutation at the very start of the law: From where do you bring it? From its mother.

ANSWER

מה לאמו, שכן נאסרה עמו בשחיטה, תאמר באחותו גדולה, שלא נאסרה עמו בשחיטה?

What is unique about its mother is that she is forbidden with it in slaughtering on the same day; can you say the same of its older sister, which is not forbidden with it in slaughtering?

ANSWER

תלמוד לומר "בחלב אמו".

Therefore, the verse teaches "in its mother's milk".

QUESTION

אשכחן אחותו גדולה, אחותו קטנה מניין?

The Gemara asks: We have found a source for its older sister; its younger sister, from where do we derive it?

ANSWER

אתיא מביניא.

The Gemara answers: It is derived from the common factors of the other cases.

QUESTION

מיהי תיתי? תיתי מאמו – מה לאמו שכן נאסרה עמו בשחיטה?

The Gemara asks: **From which one** should it be derived? If it is derived from its mother, what is unique about its mother is that she is forbidden with it in slaughtering.

ANSWER

אחותו גדולה תוכיח.

The Gemara answers: **Its older sister proves** it, as she is not forbidden in slaughtering, yet her milk is forbidden.

QUESTION

מה לאחותו גדולה שלא נכנסה עמו לדיר להתעשר? אמו תוכיח.

The Gemara asks: **What is unique about its older sister** is that she does not enter with it into the pen to be tithed? Its **mother proves** it, as she does enter the pen, yet her milk is forbidden.

ANSWER

וְחִזְרָה הַדִּין, לֹא רָאִי זֶה כְּרָאִי זֶה, וְלֹא רָאִי זֶה כְּרָאִי זֶה,

And the argument goes back and forth: The aspect of this one is not like the aspect of that one, and the aspect of that one is not like the aspect of this one.

ANSWER

הַצֵּד הַשְּׁוֹה שֶׁבֵּהֶן: שֶׁהוּא בָּשָׂר, וְאִסּוּר לְבַשֵּׁל בְּחֶלֶב, אִךְ אֲנִי אָבִיא אֲחוֹתוֹ קִטְנָה, שֶׁהוּא בָּשָׂר, וְאִסּוּר לְבַשֵּׁל בְּחֶלֶב.

The common factor between them is: that it is meat, and it is forbidden to cook in milk; so too I will bring its younger sister, which is meat, and it is forbidden to cook in milk.

QUESTION

אִי הֵכִי, אֲחוֹתוֹ גְּדוּלָּה נָמִי תִּיתִי מִבֵּינָא.

The Gemara asks: **If so, its older sister** should also be derived from the **common factors** of its mother and a cow, without needing a verse!

ANSWER

אִין הֵכִי נָמִי, אֶלָּא "בְּחֶלֶב אִמּוֹ" לָמָּה לִּי?

The Gemara answers: **Yes, it is indeed so; but** then "in its mother's milk", the third verse, **why do I need it?**

ANSWER

מִבְּעֵי לִיָּה לְכַדְתְּנָא: "בְּחֶלֶב אִמּוֹ" – אִין לִי אֶלָּא בְּחֶלֶב אִמּוֹ,

It is needed for that which was taught in a braisa: "In its mother's milk" – I only have a prohibition in its mother's milk.

עמוד ב' DAF 114B

QUESTION

הִיא עֲצָמָה בְּחֶלֶב מִנִּין?

But as for the meat of the mother animal **itself** cooked **in its** own **milk, from where** do we derive that it is forbidden?

ANSWER

אמרת קל וחומר:

You can say it is derived through a **kal vachomer**, an a fortiori argument:

EXPLANATION

ומה במקום שלא נאסר פרי עם פרי בשחיטה, נאסר פרי עם האם בשחיטה,

And if in a place where the fruit with the fruit was not forbidden in the case of slaughter—since it is permitted to slaughter two offspring of the same mother on the same day—yet the fruit with the mother is forbidden in the case of slaughter, as the Torah prohibits slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day,

EXPLANATION

מקום שנאסר פרי עם פרי בכשול – אינו דין שנאסר פרי עם האם בכשול?

then in a place where the fruit with the fruit is forbidden in the case of cooking—as it is forbidden to cook an offspring in its mother's milk—is it not logical that the fruit with the mother should be forbidden in the case of cooking, meaning that the mother's meat should not be cooked in her own milk?

STATEMENT

תלמוד לומר "בחלב אמו".

Therefore, the verse states: "in its mother's milk," to explicitly prohibit cooking the mother's meat in her own milk.

QUESTION

הא למה לי קרא, הא אתיא לה?

The Gemara asks: But why do I need this verse? Behold, it is already derived on its own from the kal vachomer!

ANSWER

אמר רב אחדבוי בר אמי: משום דאיכא למימר, סוס בן סוסיא אחי פרדה יוכיח, שאסור פרי עם פרי, ומותר פרי עם האם.

Rav Achadvoi bar Ami said: The verse is necessary because there is room to say that the case of a male horse, the son of a mare, who is the brother of a female mule—where the mare also gave birth to a mule from a donkey—proves that this logic can be refuted. For there, the fruit with the fruit is forbidden—one may not mate the horse with his sister the mule—and yet the fruit with the mother is permitted, as one may mate the horse with his mother the mare.

REFUTATION

התם, זרע האב הוא דקא גרים.

The Gemara rejects this: There, in the case of the mule, it is the seed of the father that causes the prohibition of crossbreeding, and not their relationship as offspring of the same mother.

PROOF

דקא פרד בן סוסיא אחי פרדה יוכיח, שמוותר פרי עם פרי, ואסור פרי עם האם.

For behold, the case of a male mule, the son of a mare, who is the brother of a female mule, proves this. For here, the fruit with the fruit is permitted—one may mate the male mule with his sister the female mule since they are the same species—and yet the fruit with the mother is forbidden, as one may not mate the mule with his mother the mare. This shows that the prohibition depends on the father's species, not on maternal relation.

ANSWER

אָלֵא אָמַר מַר בְּרִיָּה דְרַבִּינָא: מְשׁוּם דְּאִיכָא לְמִימַר, עֶבֶד בֶּן שִׁפְחָה אַחֵי מְשׁוּחָרְתָּת יוֹכִיחַ, שְׂאָסוּר פְּרִי עִם פְּרִי, וּמוֹתֵר פְּרִי עִם הָאִם!

Rather, Mar the son of Ravina said: The verse is necessary because there is room to say that the case of a Canaanite slave, the son of a maidservant, who is the brother of a freed maidservant, proves the kal vachomer is invalid. For here, the fruit with the fruit is forbidden—the slave may not marry his freed sister—and yet the fruit with the mother is permitted, as he may marry his slave mother!

REFUTATION

הָתָם גִּט שִׁיחָרוּר הוּא דְקָא גְרָיִם,

The Gemara rejects this: There, it is the bill of manumission that causes the prohibition, not their maternal relationship.

PROOF

דְּהָא עֶבֶד בֶּן מְשׁוּחָרְתָּת אַחֵי שִׁפְחָה יוֹכִיחַ, שְׂמוֹתֵר פְּרִי עִם פְּרִי, וְאָסוּר פְּרִי עִם הָאִם.

For behold, the case of a slave, the son of a freed maidservant, who is the brother of a maidservant, proves this. For here, the fruit with the fruit is permitted—he may marry his sister since both are slaves—and yet the fruit with the mother is forbidden, as he may not marry his freed mother.

ANSWER

אָלֵא אָמַר רַב אִידִי בַר אֲבִין: מְשׁוּם דְּאִיכָא לְמִימַר, כִּלְאֵי זֶרְעִים יוֹכִיחוּ, שְׂאָסוּר פְּרִי עִם פְּרִי, וּמוֹתֵר פְּרִי עִם הָאִם.

Rather, Rav Idi bar Avin said: The verse is necessary because there is room to say that the laws of diverse seeds of the vineyard prove it. For there, the fruit with the fruit is forbidden—one may not sow two different species of seeds together—and yet the fruit with the mother is permitted, as one may sow any seed in the ground, which is the mother of all growth.

REFUTATION

כָּלוּם נֶאָסֵר פְּרִי עִם פְּרִי אֲלֵא עַל יְדֵי הָאִם? דְּהָא חִטִּי וּשְׂעִירִי בִּכְדָּא וְלֹא מִיתְסָרוּ.

The Gemara rejects this: Is the fruit with the fruit forbidden at all except by means of the mother, the ground? For behold, if one puts wheat and barley in a pitcher, they are not forbidden as kilayim. The prohibition only applies when they are sown in the ground.

ANSWER

אָלֵא אָמַר רַב אֲשִׁי: מְשׁוּם דְּאִיכָא לְמִימַר, מָה לְפָרִי עִם פְּרִי, שְׁפֹן שְׁנֵי גּוֹפִיִּים, תֵּאמַר בְּפָרִי עִם הָאִם, שְׁפֹן גּוּף אֶחָד, מְשׁוּם הֵכִי אֵיצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא.

Rather, Rav Ashi said: The verse is necessary because there is room to say: What is unique about fruit with fruit—such as the kid and its mother's milk—that makes them forbidden? For they are two separate bodies that were never one. Can you say

the same for the fruit with the mother—the mother's meat and her milk—which are essentially one body? Because of this, the verse was necessary to explicitly include them.

QUESTION

אמר רב אשי: מנין לִבְשָׁר בֶּחֱלֵב שְׂאִסוּר בִּאֲכִילָה?

Rav Ashi says: From where do we derive that meat cooked in milk is forbidden for eating, since the Torah only explicitly wrote a prohibition against cooking?

ANSWER

שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר "לֹא תֹאכַל כָּל תוֹעֵבָה" – כָּל שֶׁתַּעֲבֹתִי לָךְ הָרִי הוּא בְּבֵל תֹּאכַל.

As it is stated: "You shall not eat any abominable thing." This teaches: Anything that I have made abominable, meaning forbidden, to you by prohibiting its cooking, behold it is under the prohibition of "you shall not eat."

QUESTION

ואין לי אלא באכילה, בהנאה מנין?

And I only have a source for a prohibition against eating; from where do we derive a prohibition against deriving benefit from it?

ANSWER

בְּדִרְבֵּי אֲבָהוּ, דָּאֵמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: כָּל מְקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר "לֹא יֹאכַל", "לֹא תֹאכַל", "לֹא תֹאכְלוּ" – אֶחָד אִיסוּר אֲכִילָה וְאֶחָד אִיסוּר הִנָּאָה בַּמִּשְׁמַע,

It is in accordance with the teaching of Rabbi Abbahu, as Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Elazar said: Wherever it is stated "it shall not be eaten," "you shall not eat," or "you shall not eat" in the plural, both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of benefit are implied,

EXPLANATION

עַד שִׁיפְרוֹט לָךְ הַכֶּתִיב, כְּדֶרֶךְ שִׁפְרוֹט לָךְ בְּנִבְלָה לִגְר בְּנִתְּנָה וְלִגְוֵי בְּמִכְרָה.

unless the verse specifies for you that benefit is permitted, just as it specified for you regarding a carcass, where the Torah permitted deriving benefit by giving it to the resident alien as a gift and to the non-Jew by sale.

PROOF

דִּתְּנָא: "לֹא תֹאכְלוּ כָּל נֶבֶלָה לִגְר אֲשֶׁר בִּשְׁעָרֶיהָ תִּתְּנֶנָּה וְאֹכְלָהּ אוֹ מְכֹר לְנֹכְרִי" – אֵין לִי אֱלָא לִגְר בְּנִתְּנָה, וְלִגְוֵי בְּמִכְרָה;

As it is taught in a baraisa: "You shall not eat any carcass; you may give it to the stranger who is within your gates that he may eat it, or you may sell it to a foreigner." From this I only know that it may be given to a resident alien as a gift, and to a non-Jew by sale;

EXPLANATION

לִגְר בְּמִכְרָה מִנֵּיין? תִּלְמוּד לומר: "לִגְר תִּתְּנֶנָּה אוֹ מְכֹר."

from where do we know that it may be transferred to a resident alien by sale as well? The verse states: "you may give it to the stranger... or sell it," showing you have both options.

EXPLANATION

לגוי בנתינה מנין? תלמוד לומר: "תתננה... או מכור לנכרי".

From where do we know that it may be transferred to a non-Jew as a gift? The verse states: "you may give it... or sell it to a foreigner."

STATEMENT

נמצא אחד גר ואחד גוי, בין במכירה בין בנתינה, דברי רבי מאיר.

Consequently, we find that for both a resident alien and a non-Jew, both by sale and by gift are permitted. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

STATEMENT

רבי יהודה אומר: דברים ככתבן, לגר בנתינה ולגוי במכירה.

Rabbi Yehuda says: The matters are to be understood literally as they are written: it may only be given to a resident alien as a gift, and to a non-Jew by sale.

QUESTION

מאי טעמא דרבי יהודה?

The Gemara asks: What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda?

EXPLANATION

אי סלקא דעתך כדקאמר רבי מאיר, לכתוב רחמנא "לא תאכלו כל נבלה לגר אשר בשעריך תתננה ואכלה ומכור" – "או" למה לי?

If it could enter your mind to say as Rabbi Meir says, let the Merciful One write: "You shall not eat any carcass; you may give it to the stranger who is within your gates that he may eat it, and sell it." Why do I need the word "or"?

INFERENCE

שמע מינה לדברים ככתבן הוא דאמא: לגר בנתינה, ולגוי במכירה.

Learn from this that it comes to teach that the matters are literally as they are written: a gift is only to a resident alien as a gift, and a sale is only to a non-Jew by sale.

ANSWER

ורבי מאיר אמר לה: האי "או" להקדים נתינה דגר למכירה דגוי.

And Rabbi Meir would say to you: This word "or" is needed to give precedence to giving to a resident alien over selling to a non-Jew.

EXPLANATION

ורבי יהודה, להקדים נתינה דגר למכירה דגוי לא צריך קרא, סברא הוא: זה אתה מצווה להחיותו, וזה אי אתה מצווה להחיותו.

And Rabbi Yehuda argues: To give precedence to giving to a resident alien over selling to a non-Jew does not require a verse, for it is a logical deduction: This one, the resident alien, you are commanded to sustain, and that one, the non-Jew, you are not commanded to sustain.

STATEMENT

(סִימָן: שָׁבֵת, חֹרֶשׁ, וְכֵלָאֵי זְרָעִים, אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ, וְשִׁלּוּחַ הַקָּן).

The Gemara provides a mnemonic: Shabbos, plowing, diverse seeds, "it and its offspring," and sending away the nest.

QUESTION

אֵלָא מֵעֵתָּה,

The Gemara asks: **But if so,**

SUMMARY

In this daf, the Gemara clarifies the machlokes regarding whether one receives lashes for cooking or eating already-forbidden meats like chelev, piggul, or notar in milk, resolving the kasha by showing that some Tannaim hold that an issur can indeed take effect on another issur. We then analyze the status of cooking meat in whey, which supports Reish Lakish's view that whey is not treated like milk for this prohibition. Finally, the Gemara goes through a detailed analysis of the three pesukim of "in its mother's milk," showing how we derive the prohibitions of cooking meat in the milk of other species, in the milk of an older sister, and ultimately, the meat of the mother animal itself in its own milk, demonstrating that these cannot be derived through a simple kal vachomer or a binyan av due to various refutations.

Look at the beautiful shakla v'tarya we have on today's daf. The Gemara is trying to build a kal vachomer, a logical deduction, to extend the prohibition of basar b'chalav to other animals, like a cow or a sheep. Lichoira, the logic is absolutely ironclad! But then Rav Ashi comes and shows us that at the very foundation of the logic, there is a 'pircha', a subtle, overlooked difference that refutes the entire structure. What worked for the mother animal doesn't apply to the cow, because of a completely different halachah regarding slaughtering on the same day. Without a specific, extra word from the Torah, our most brilliant human logic would have fallen apart.

This is a massive yesod for our daily avodas Hashem. How often do we build elaborate structures of logic in our own minds to justify our actions? We tell ourselves, 'If this is muttar, then surely that must be muttar,' or 'If Hashem wants me to do this, then lichoira He must want me to do that.' We use our own intellect to decide what is right, what is wrong, and how we should run our lives. But the Gemara is teaching us that human logic, as sharp as it may be, has its limits. There is always a 'pircha', a blind spot we didn't see, a bias we didn't account for.

True emunah and yiras Shamayim mean realizing that we cannot rely solely on our own understanding to navigate the world. We need the Torah's guidance, the words of Chazal, and the mesorah of our Rabbeim to anchor us. When we submit our intellect to the ratzon of Hashem, we save ourselves from the mistakes that even the most logical minds can make.

Today, before you make a decision based on your own logical justification, especially one where you are tempted to bend a halachah or a hanhagah, stop and ask yourself: 'Am I relying on my own intellect here, or am I following the clear guidance of the Torah and Shulchan Aruch?'